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By letter of 26 ~eptember 1980 the President of the Council 
requested the Europea~ Parliament to deliver an opinion on the 
recommendation concer~ing the registration of work involving 
recombinant desoxyribqnucleic acid (DNA). 
The President of ithe European Parliament referred this 
proposal to the Commi~tee on the Environment, Public Health and 
Consumer Protection o~ 13 October 1980. 
On 26 September .~980 the Committee on the Environment, Public 
Health and Consumer P1otection appointed Mr Ceravolo rapporteur. 
It considered the pro~osal for a recommendation at its meetings 
of 5 December 1980, 2Q October 1981 and 10 November 1981. At 
the last of these meetings the motion for a resolution drawn up 
! 
by Mr Ceravolo was di~cussed and rejected following adoption of 
I 
the amendment tabled ~y Mrs Lentz-Cornette (PE 74.522/Am.1). 
The amendment was ado~ted by the committee by 9 votes to 8. 
i 
Present: Mr Collinsj chairman; Mrs Weber, vice-chairman; 
Mr Ceravolo, rapporte r; Mr Bombard, Mr Clinton (deputizing for 
Mr Mertens), Mr Combe Mr Ghergo, Miss Hooper, Mr Key (deputizing 
for Mr Muntingh), MrslLentz-CorneLte, Mr Protopapadakis, Mrs Pruvot, 
Mrs Schleicher, Mrs S~rivener, Mrs Seibel-Emmerling, Mr Sherlock 
and Mrs Squarcialupi. I 
I 
I 
I 
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The Committee ol the Environme:t, Public Health and Consumer 
Protection hereby supmits to the European Parliament the following 
motion for a resolut~on together with explanatory state~nt, 
I MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
I 
I 
embodying the opiniop of the European Parliament on the proposal from· 
the Commission of th~ European Communities to the Council for a draft 
recommendation concefning the registration of work involving recombinant 
desoxyribonucleic ac~d (DNA) 
The European Parliam~nt, 
i 
- having regard to the draft recommendation concerning the registration 
of work involving tecombinant desoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), 
- having been consulted by the Council (Doc. 1-448/80), 
- having regard to t~e report of the Committee on the Environment, 
Public Health and onsumer Protection 
(Doc. 1-810/81), 
Approves the draft recommendation proposed by the Commission of the 
European Communiti So 
- 5 - PE 74.522/fino 
1. Background 
B 
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 
As early as 4 December 1978, 
the Commission submitted a proposal for a directive establishing 
safety measures against the conjectural risks associated with 
recombinant DNA work (Doc. 55/79). This document set out 's4x different 
sets of considerations 1 indicating the need for national laws to· pontrol 
the activity of genetic manipulation: 
1.1. Harmonization between the Member States 
In view of the different containment systems existing in 
Europe, it is necessary, in order to avoid wide discrepancies 
between research capacity and thus competitiveness, to adopt 
national laws harmonized around a core of Community principles. 
1. 2. The exemplary value of legislation 
un ~ene~ic manipulation technology 
In the long term, the applications of molecular biology in 
agriculture and industry will inevitable transform life in society 
~nd will induce significant and, possible, irreversible changes 
to our environment. To request that the techniques which 
are to bring about these changes should be subjected, from the 
start, to statutory control and to legislation, does not 
constitute a curb on progress but recognition of the need to 
adapt society to new scientific developments. 
The activity of genetic manipulation, even though the 
risk i~ represents is only conjectural has been well analysed in 
the Member States and is possibly not greater than the dangers 
associated with conventional research into pathogens, constitutes 
an exemplary field for testing compatibilities between legislation 
and the development of modern technologies. 
1.3. Gravity of the hazards 
The classification of a risk as conjectural does not imply 
that the risk under consideration is benign. 
If the gravity of the dangers involved is such as to require 
the elaboration of ·expensive protection mechanisms, it must also 
be logical to draw up regulations to ensure their effective 
use as protection against the risks in question. 
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1. 4. Expansion of recombinant DNA work 
Assuming that a risk exists in connection with recombinant 
DNA, it will increase with time in proportion to the total number 
of sites where such work is carried on. 
1.5. Transnational nature of the risk 
The fact that genetic engineering work usually involves bacteria 
and viruses, which, in the event of their escaping from the 
laboratory, may spread across frontiers, limits the legislative 
independence of the individual states. 
The agreements and guarantees to be established between 
neighbouring states must be based on a core of jointly agreed 
principles. 
1.6. Research in laboratories of private undertakings 
In the absence of legal measures, it is extremely difficult 
·::.o compel laboratories in private industry to adhere to national 
guidelines on recombinant DNA. It may happen that different 
laboratories working at the same level of risk do not observe 
the same rules in respect of safeguards and containment. (In 
the interes~s of brevity the rapporteur has confined himself 
t.o reproducing and often quoting the main points of the 
former proposal for a directive which was subsequently withdrawn. 
As regards remaining points, he would refer the committee to the 
full text.) 
2. As regards this proposal for a directive, the Economic and 
Social Committee, after undertaking a balanced analysis of both 
sides of the argument, unanimously declared itself in favour of 
a directive. Moreover, the Economic and Social Co1!fil1~ttee, 
in order to take account of all the available information, and 
not to create excessive barriers to research or neglect the 
protection of the citizens of the Member States, had also· decided to 
prepare a study to deal, in particularu with the following problems: 
the extent to which specific physical (e.g. particular 
labora~ory equipment) and biological (e.g. selected vectors and 
receivers) safety standards are adequate in the light of 
presumed risks, the importance of the establishment by the 
Member States of a uniform position on these questionsu particularly 
as regards the industrial application of this new technolgoy, 
the need ·::.o harmonize · provisions in force at national level 
which is particularly important in cases where, as in the area 
under consideration, the legal force and substance of such 
provisions diverge. Such disparities may make themselves felt 
particularly at the industrial application stage. 
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on the basis of this study, the Zconomic and Social Committee 
organized a seminar in May 1981 to consult expert• from th, 
world of science, agriculture, industry, the trade unions and 
representatives of the public interest. 
' ~ i :. 
3. Seminar held by the Economic and Social Committee 
It cannot be said that the discussion led to unanimous 
conclusions, though it was of considerable interest. In paiticular, 
as regards ·the basic premise of the Commission's dra.ft recommendcltion 
that, in the light of past experience, possible risks should be 
considered 'non-existen-:: or small', certain statements contain views 
which clearly leave the matter open to doubt: 
3.1. Brian M. Richards: while maintaining that few scientists now consider 
the initial fears to be justified, stated that there was still a 
cer~ain amount of concern at the fact that appropriate criteria for 
assessing conjectural dangers had not yet been formulated. 
3.2. ?rofessor P. Puglisi: considered that two factors should be considered 
above all others, namely the need to prevent the introduction of 
excessively restrictive standards for the structure of laboratories 
which might restrict research possibilities to given industrial 
activities~ and the possibility that, if all the necessary 
ingredients for pursuing DNA technology were sold freely, uncontrollable 
and uncontrolled experiment, might be carried out. 
3.3. William Bruce: whereas he accepted, in the case of laboratories 
undertaking work falling within risk level groups 1 and 2, 
4. 
the principle of control ':Jy safety committees which required 
only t~e notification of experiments, in respect of those falling withn 
~:..s'.<. ca·t.egories 3 and 4, given ·the complexity of measures and the 
higher s·::andards required, highly qualified national teams should ~teep 
the wor~ under review. 
In o::::-de:::::- to demonstrate fur-::.her that what your rapporteur 
considers the cen·::.ral question, namely that of conjectural risks, 
renains unanswered, he has reco~ded below certain extracts from 
an interview with Professor Sgaramella, lecturer in molecular biology 
at the university of Pavia and well-known expert in genetic 
engineering, who, although not one of the rapporteurs, has 
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perhaps been the highest authority most active in playing down 
supposed dangers and fears. 
The interview appeared shortly before the seminar in the April 1981 
edition of 'Scienza e vita'. 
Question: 'What could be the consequences of this lack of precise 
directives which affects all laboratories?' 
Reply: 
Question: 
'There is a danger that foreign colleagues might undertake 
work in Italy which they could not do abroad. For 
example, if someone wished to clone the B hepatitis virus, 
which is notoriously dangerous, the decision whether or 
not to allow the experiment to take place in a given 
laboratory would be left exclusively to the discretion of 
the director of the institute concerned . 
'What justifie; the general tenden.;y in the world today to 
relax certain safety standards governing genetic 
engineering?' 
'Our knowledge of the micro-organisms which we are dealing 
with is much greater today than it was some years ago. 
We now know that certain hypotheses suggestive of 
science fiction that were once put forward are unlikely 
to be fulfilled. It is important to observe certain 
precautions, for example, such as not using the DNA 
of vectors of viral illnesses. That does not mean, 
however, that the.chance propagation of dangerous 
agents such as unknown or oncogenic viruses 
may not occur. 
5. Further considerations 
5 .1. Claims as to the virtual certainty of the harmlessness of the 
experimental practices adopted hitherto are based on the considerable 
experience gained with the bacteria Escheri.chia coli, the most common 
microbic agent used in genetic engineering. This information would na.J., 
appear incomplete, as we know today that certain other less well-
known microbic agents are being used. 
5.2. A recent report from Washington states that genetic engineering ~,, 
techniques have made possible the creation of a new bacteria capable of 
destroying dioxin gas (well-known following the Seveso tragedy and its 
use by the Americans in Vietname for 'defoliation' purposes). This 
micro-organism apparently belongs to the Pseudornonas genus. 
5.3. The same genus contains the micro-organism created some years 
ago by General Electric which is able to feed itself on hydrocarbons and can 
thus be used in operations to eliminate sea pollution following oil spills. 
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5. 4 It is worth pointing out that, after all the initial enthusia'Sm·; 
everything has remained blocked, despite the granting of the patent, 
owing to the possible risk that such a micro-organism might spread in 
an uncontrolled manner 1 for example in the fuel tanks of planes. 
5.5. A further point to consider is the use of DNA originating from 
tumoral viruses. It should be remembered that any oncogenic consequences 
for human begins as a result of these experiments, which are already 
being ca~ried out, will come to light only after several years, when the 
damage may prove irreversible. 
5.6. In addition, genetic engineering is not an exact technique. Even 
today, genes are never transplanted in their pure state. The transplant 
of genes is usually accompanied by unwanted fractions of other genes, 
which may represent as much as 20% of the total. 
(In the interests of brevity, the general theme of genetic engi-
neering will not be dealt with here; reference should be made to the 
draft report submitted previously on the Commission's proposal for a 
directive (See PE 64.494). 
6. Submission of a draft recommendation 
On 28 July 1980 the Commission submitted a draft recommendation 
concerning the registration of work involving recombinant desmcyri-
bonucleic acid (DNA). The European Parliament was asked for its opinion 
on the new proposal on 26 September 1980. The draft recommendation 
replaced the proposal for a directive submitted earlier. 
7. General observations on the draft recommendation 
!rapporteur's views supp~rted by a minority) 
7 .1. The draft recommendation is based on the assu~ption -t:hat~-------·-·--
in the light of the information acquired, 'the conjectural risks 
associated with the work involving the production or utilization 
of recombinant DNA are probably non-existent or small'. 
In this connection, it should be recalled that the text of 
the preceding proposal for a directive, which was 
subsequently withdrawn, was based on a similar premise expressed 
as follows: 'the classification of a risk as conjectural does 
not imply that the risk under consideration is benign'. The 
entire approach of the directive avoided any tendency to entertain 
excessive fears or over-dramatization. 
It is surprising that this reasoning, if valid a short time 
ago, should no longer be so today. 
7.2. The recommendation maintains that control and safety measures 
applied voluntarily in most Western countries are satisfactory 
and can be continuously adapted to new developments. It would 
appear that this conviction may be based on information derived 
exclusively from laboratories operating in the public sector. 
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The preceding directive contains the following text: 1While 
it is possible to conceiveu in the absence of national legislations 
regulating work with recombinant DNA, that the governmental funding 
agencies maintain a certain level of control over these 
research activities of universities and national institutes, it is 
far more difficult to envisage, in the absence of legal 
dispositions, a system compelling the laboratories from private 
industries to adhere to the terms of national guidelines on 
recombinant DNA 1 • 
This consideration would seem self-evident and the rapporteur 
fails to see why today it should be abandoned. 
7.3. The recommendation maintains that certain problems may arise 
as regards the long-term effects of possible contamination 
which, although improbableu nevertheless remains a possibility. 
In this connection, the recommendation adds that 'no experimental 
analysis has been able to be made on long-term effects which 
work on genetic engineering could have on the adaptation and 
gradual evolution of micro-organismsu carriers of foreign DNA. 
Micro-organisms might be able to succeed in crossing 
laboratory barriers and to find a habitat in which to survive.' 
It is hard to understand, faced with a risk about which 
there is so little knowledge, and which cannot therefore be 
described as 'non-existent or small', why the recommendation 
confines itself to providing for a system of inventorizing 
work undertaken with a view to being able to trace the origin 
of contamination and hence acting after the event. 
7.4. The recommendation states that 1 each Member State (must) 
be free to adopt adequate legislative, regulatory or 
administrative measures'. 
Whereas in the preceding directive priority was 
given to the need to harmonize legislation at Community level 
in order to avoid distortions of competition, the recommendation 
has simply reversed this position. 
7.5. The recommendation 1 asks Member States to adopt a 
common definition of work involving recombinant DNA 
and to act in such a way that no laboratory can undertake this 
work without having previously notified to the competent 
regional or national authority and deposited with them 
information defining the nature of the activity envisaged and 
which allows evaluation of the planned conditions of 
safety and protection in the execution of this activity'o 
PE 74.522 /fin. 
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If the intention is truly to achieve this result, a suitable 
legislative instrument is required that provides for adequ,te 
control measures. If there is an effective case for it, 
it should not be the subject of a mere recommendation. 
It is maintained that the recommendation is justified by 
the negative results of analyses undertaken in the USA and 
Europe to establish the significance of dangers which 
might result from genetic engineering. Generally speaking, reference 
is made to numerous experiments carried out at the higher level 
(III and IV) and the recommendation omits to mention, in particular, 
information on the closed world of private laboratories. 
7.6. It is also maintained that the draft recommendation makes 
adequate provision for the safety problems encountered hitherto, 
and that the principal effect of a solution through the adoption of 
detailed legislation would be ·to slow down the development of 
research and prevent the adaptation and the continuous evolution 
of protection methods and the classificaton of work according to 
risk categories. But the Commission itself, in the preceding 
directive, stated that 'to request that the techniques which 
are to bring these changes ( ... significant and possibly 
irreversible changes to our environment) are subjected from the 
start to statutory control and to legislation does not constitute 
an aggression to progress but, on the contrary, a recognition of 
the need to adapt society to new scientific developments 
for establishing compatibilities between legislation and the 
development of modern technologies 
his own achievements. 
to protect man against 
Provided that the legislation adopted is tolerant, flexible, and 
associated to a stimulation of research through funding, the 
opportunity should not be missed'. 
If it were true that legislation had the effect of slowing 
down research, then environmental strategy as a whole would have 
to be reversed, starting with that devised for new chemical 
products to be placed on the market, in respect of which the 
adoption of an 'identity card' is planned in order to prevent 
the uncontrolled distribution of substances dangerous both for 
the environment and for hum an health, as has occurred in the past 
and still occurs today. 
7~. The draft recommendation has been'given a threefold 
justification: 
(a) the negative results of the analyses undertaken in the USA 
and Europe to establish the reality of certain risks~ 
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(b) the absence of even minor cases of contamination or 
accidental infection 8 even though a great amount 
of work has been carried out throughout the world~ 
(c) the discipline of all European research workers who 
have immediately agreed to followu on a purely 
voluntary basis, the protection and safety 
measures proposed by the consultative committees. 
These justifications are not convincing. In respect of 
certain risks, for example, those connected with long-term 
effects, the Commission itself has stated (see above) that 
vit is not possible to undertake an experimental analysis'. 
Furthermore, no mention has been made of the fact that 
genetic engineering has only just got underway and a vast and 
unknown field of experimentation, which may, however, be 
defined theoretically, has yet to be covered, with all the 
possible advantages and dangers which may arise. 
Sound legi_slation should precisely be formulated 
to allow for possible subsequent developments. 
As regards points (a) and (b), it would seem extremely 
hazardous for the Commission to make generalizations on the 
basis of information which excludes all private research. 
7.8. Finally, the Commission states that 1 certain 1 experts -
without defining them further - appointed by the Member 
States will meet at regular intervals to:, 
- undertake a general analysis of the situation, 
- examine all possible measures leading to harmonization; 
establishu should the case arise, according to progress in 
knowledge, the list of work which, in all Member Statesu 
should be forbidden or subject to compulsory safety 
measures; 
in cases where unforeseen developments require it, 
modify the terms of the present recommendation or prepare 
the text for a draft Council directive. 
The best that can be said of this commitment on the part of 
the Commission is that it reveals an awareness of the difficulties 
involved in solving the problems at issue by means of a mere 
recommendation. In reality, however, the tackling of long-
standing problems, such as the list of dangerous experiments 
which are already subject in various Member States to certain 
controls or prohibitions, has been postponed. 
And on what basis can an analysis be made of the situation ifu 
as seems likely, a mere recommendation fails to provide the expected 
and desired results, and if the greater part of ~esearchu namely 
private research, remains outside the scope of effective control?,· : 1 
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8. The rapporteur's viewpoint was supported orily by a minority 
in the committee. The majority view wa~ that~ on the basis of 
the considerations outlined by the Commission and in the iight of 
data that had become available in the past two yeirs, th~ draft 
recomoendation, as submitted by the C6Imilission of the European 
Cornr.1unities to the Council, should be approved •. 
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